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ABSTRACT
Employee volunteering refers to employees giving time to volunteer for charitable
causes with explicit support from their employer. Offering support for employee
volunteering is one of the fastest-growing areas of employee benefits. Using a laboratory
experiment, I examine the effectiveness of individual employee volunteering programs in
motivating employees’ altruistic behavior outside the firm, as well as their work
productivity and altruistic behavior inside the firm. I predict and find that the level of
firm support for employee volunteering not only affects employees’ volunteering
engagement outside the firm, but also affects employees’ work productivity inside the
firm. Moreover, I predict and find that although the presence of firm support for
employee volunteering spills over to positively influence employee altruistic behavior
inside the firm, the level of firm support is less consequential. The findings of my study
suggest that individual employee volunteering programs can serve as an effective
management control tool that leads to multidimensional benefits beyond Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) objectives, and thus provide useful insights to firms when
designing their employee volunteering programs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Employee volunteering refers to employees giving time to volunteer for charitable
causes with explicit support from their employer. Offering support for employee
volunteering is one of the fastest-growing areas of employee benefits (Grant 2012;
Rodell, Breitsohl, Schröder, and Keating 2016; Glassdoor 2017; Society for Human
Resource Management 2019; Knox 2020). To promote and guide employee volunteering,
many companies (e.g., Aetna, Allstate, Dell, ExxonMobil, Google, Microsoft, PwC,
Salesforce, and Verizon) have formal policies in place outlining how much volunteer
time-off (VTO) employees can take in a year and the amount of firm-sponsored matching
grants employees can claim for charities where they spend their volunteer hours. For
example, Salesforce employees are eligible to take up to 56 hours of VTO per year to
volunteer for charities that are personal to them (Salesforce 2021). Similarly, in addition
to VTO, Microsoft supports employee volunteering via its Volunteer Match Program
($25 per volunteer hour), which resulted in its U.S. employees volunteering more than
750,000 hours in 2020 and Microsoft, in turn, donated $221 million to various charitable
organizations (Microsoft 2020).
In this study, I investigate how variation across the level of firm support for
individual employee volunteering outside the firm affects employee volunteering
engagement, as well as their work behavior inside the firm. Given management
accountants’ responsibility for the design of control systems and employee incentives
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(Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Merchant and Van der Stede 2017), my study aims to
provide insights into the effectiveness of offering these employee volunteering programs
as a form of informal control across three consequential outcomes: 1) employee
volunteering engagement outside the firm; 2) employee work productivity; and 3)
employee altruistic behavior inside the firm.
Employee volunteering is a topic of growing importance in organizations around
the globe (Rodell et al. 2016; Bengtson 2020; Deloitte 2020). In the U.S. alone, it
contributes $5 billion annually to charities (America’s Charities 2020). A recent survey
indicates that 60% of U.S. companies offer VTO and an additional 21% plan to offer it in
the next two years (America’s Charities 2020).1 40% of Fortune 500 companies offer
volunteer matching grants in addition to VTO to promote employee volunteering
(Corporate Giving and Matching Gift Statistics 2021). Employee volunteering programs
generally come in two forms: individual-based volunteering and group-based
volunteering. Individual-based employee volunteering is different from structured groupbased volunteering (e.g., Corporate Volunteer Day) such that the employee (as opposed
to the employer) selects volunteering activities that are personal to them, instead of
feeling compelled to engage in firm-planned volunteering that is often aligned with the
company’s public relations or marketing initiatives. In this study, I focus on the
behavioral consequences of individual-based employee volunteering that gives
employees the choice to voluntarily engage.

1

VTO is often provided above and beyond regular vacation benefits and personal time off (PTO) as an
extra employee benefit. VTO allows employees to schedule their own volunteer activities during working
hours while still getting paid. By definition, VTO is paid time off to volunteer such that the employer (as
opposed to employees) bear the opportunity cost associated with volunteering.
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Many companies such as PwC and Salesforce have begun to prioritize individual
employee volunteering (America’s Charities 2020; PwC Volunteers 2020; Salesforce
2022). According to a Glassdoor survey, 75% of the Millennial workforce expects their
employer to participate in social good, either through monetary donations or volunteering
programs (Glassdoor 2017). Although offering support for employees’ monetary
donations has declined over the past five years, offering support for employee
volunteering has increased by 5% during the same period (Society for Human Resource
Management 2019). Because of the time, skill, and expertise involved, employees
themselves also tend to view volunteering as a more important and more meaningful
form of workplace giving than monetary donations (Grant 2012; Glassdoor 2017).
Moreover, recent archival evidence suggests that the presence of employee volunteering
programs can improve firm-level financial performance for up to six years (Knox 2020).
Because of the abovementioned benefits, employee volunteering may be particularly
valuable to firms’ long-term success.
Despite the increased popularity and possible long-term benefits of supporting
employee volunteering at the firm level, little is understood about its behavioral
implications at the individual level, namely, employee volunteering engagement, work
productivity, and altruistic behavior. Causal evidence regarding the behavioral
consequences of employee volunteering is nearly absent (Jones, Newman, Shao, and
Cooke 2019, p. 294). Existing research related to employee volunteering has focused
primarily on the intended external benefits such as recruiting (e.g., Backhaus, Stone, and
Heiner 2002), corporate reputation (e.g., Jones and Willness 2013; Lins, Servaes, and
Tamayo 2017; Hartzmark and Sussman 2019), and consumer attraction (e.g., Elfenbein,

3

Fisman, and McManus 2012). However, little is understood about the potential internal
consequences of firm support for individual employee volunteering, especially on
employees’ work productivity and altruistic behavior inside the firm (Cardinaels, Ruan,
and Yin 2020; Newman, Tafkov, and Zhou 2020; Douthit, Martin, and McAllister 2021).
The focus of my study is to examine whether providing support for individual employee
volunteering can also serve as a management control tool that leads to multiple
motivational benefits beyond recruitment and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
objectives documented in prior research (e.g., Backhaus et al. 2002; Lins et al. 2017;
Hartzmark and Sussman 2019), and thus move forward our understanding about these
employee volunteering programs from a standard CSR tool to a motivational tool.
To investigate the behavioral consequences of providing varying levels of firm
support for employee volunteering, I focus on a setting where employees receive salaried
compensation and firms’ support for employee volunteering varies across two levels: 1)
time support only (i.e., providing VTO only); or 2) dual support of time and money (i.e.,
providing a matching grant in addition to VTO). I also consider a baseline setting where
employees have no opportunity to volunteer during their regular work time (i.e., the firm
does not provide VTO nor offer a matching grant).
I posit that firms’ support for employee volunteering can function as a
management control tool affecting employee behaviors across three meaningful
outcomes. First, I predict that by “putting your money where your mouth is,” providing a
matching grant in addition to VTO will signal a higher level of firm support for employee
volunteering, and thus induce higher employee motivation to engage in individual
volunteering. Thus, relative to providing VTO only, providing dual support of time and
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money (VTO + matching grant) will positively affect employees’ volunteering
engagement outside the firm. Second, drawing on theories of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960;
Uhl-Bien and Maslyn 2003; Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012) and moral satisfaction
(Kahneman and Knetsch 1992; Balakrishnan, Sprinkle, and Williamson 2011), I predict
that as the level of firm support for employee volunteering increases, employees’ work
productivity inside the firm will also increase. Third, drawing on moral consistency
theory (Gneezy, Imas, Brown, Nelson, and Norton 2012; Susewind and Hoelzl 2014;
Mullen and Monin 2016) and mental accounting (Thaler 1999; Rajagopal and Rha 2009),
I predict the presence of firm support for employee volunteering externally will spill over
to positively influence employee altruistic behavior internally. However, I expect that the
level of firm support is less consequential for this positive spillover effect.
I test my predictions via a multi-stage experiment with a real effort task. In
addition to a fixed salary, I manipulate volunteering support at three levels: 1) no support
(VTO absent), 2) time support (VTO present), and 3) dual support of time and money
(VTO + matching grant).2 The experiment consists of two stages. In the first stage,
participants work on the real effort task for three rounds. In the two VTO conditions,
participants have an opportunity to give some of their regular work time to volunteer for
a charity of their choice during the middle round with (or without) a matching grant. In
the second stage, participants have an opportunity to help a coworker with the same real
effort task. The purpose of the second stage task is to capture time-based employee
altruism inside the firm.

For the sake of brevity, I often refer to “firm support for employee volunteering” as “volunteering
support”.
2
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Consistent with my predictions, I find that the level of volunteering support not
only affects employees’ volunteering engagement outside the firm, but also spills over to
influence employee behavior inside the firm. Specifically, my results show that first,
providing a higher level of volunteering support (VTO + matching grant) is effective in
promoting employee volunteering engagement in terms of time employees spend on
volunteering and their volunteering output, compared to only providing VTO. Second,
although VTO by itself does not impact employee work productivity compared to when
VTO is absent, providing extra monetary support for employee volunteering in the form
of a matching grant significantly boosts their work productivity inside the firm.
Furthermore, my results show that although the presence of firm support for employee
volunteering spills over to positively influence employee altruistic behavior inside the
firm, the level of firm support is less consequential.
My study offers important insights for firms regarding implementing and
managing employee volunteering programs, as well as contributes to multiple streams of
literature. First, my study extends the emerging accounting literature on charitable
incentives that has primarily focused on the performance effects of varying forms of
monetary donations (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Douthit et al. 2021; Johnson, Khim, and
Tian 2021). My study introduces employee volunteering programs as an alternative form
of charitable incentive (i.e., time-based vs. money-based donations) and provides initial
evidence regarding when and how the level of volunteering support can matter. Second,
by documenting the effects that differing levels of volunteering support have on
individual employees, my study extends existing volunteering research (Jones 2010;
Rodell 2013; Newman et al. 2020; Cardinaels et al. 2020; Knox 2020) by providing clear
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causal evidence regarding the relation between firm’s volunteering support levels for
charitable causes outside the firm and employee work behavior inside the firm. Prior
research related to employee volunteering has focused on the factors that affect the
likelihood of employee participation (e.g., DeVoe and Pfeffer 2007, 2010; Grant 2012;
Rodell 2013; Newman et al. 2020). Using a common type of compensation (i.e., salary),
my study extends this line of literature to examine the performance outcomes of
volunteering support for external charities, as well as internal performance outcomes in
terms of work productivity and employee altruistic behavior toward a coworker. My
results suggest that volunteering support can serve as an effective management control
tool to influence multiple outcomes of employee behavior. Lastly, by examining the
spillover effects of employee volunteering externally on employee behaviors internally,
my study complements prior CSR literature that has primarily focused on external
benefits of corporate philanthropy (e.g., Elfenbein et al. 2012; Kitzmueller and
Shimshack 2012; Lins et al. 2017; Hartzmark and Sussman 2019).
From a practical perspective, my study provides an initial examination of the
performance effects of varying forms of employee volunteering programs which are an
emerging type of employee benefit and management control. Informal controls such as
tone at the top, shared values, or cultural norms have the advantage of being relatively
unobtrusive, compared to other forms of management controls (e.g., performance
evaluation, monitoring). My findings suggest that employee volunteering programs can
have multidimensional benefits that extend their value beyond traditional CSR objectives,
and thus provide useful insights for management accountants who have responsibility
over incentive and control system design (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Merchant and Van
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der Stede 2017). As firms implement and manage employee volunteering programs, my
study highlights the relevance of considering how these programs affect both external and
internal business objectives. Specifically, my results suggest that providing a matching
grant in addition to VTO is needed for promoting employee volunteering engagement and
boosting their work productivity, but not for the positive spillover of internal altruism.
The findings of my study can facilitate firms’ decisions about how to react to this
growing trend of workplace giving and provide useful insights regarding the internal and
external benefits versus internal costs when designing these employee volunteering
programs.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Management control involves managers taking steps to motivate desired
employee behavior (Merchant and Van der Stede 2017). In addition to formal controls
such as financial incentives and performance evaluations, firms often rely on informal
controls such as cultural norms that are built on shared values, written or unwritten, to
govern employees’ behaviors. Firm culture can be shaped in many ways, both in words
(e.g., value statements, codes of conduct) and in firm actions (e.g., work design,
employee benefits), and is likely to affect multiple aspects of employees’ behavior. I
posit that firms’ support for employee volunteering can function as cultural control
influencing employee behaviors across multiple outcomes. Given my focus on firms’
support for employee volunteering, I first theorize how the level of firm support affects
employee behavior outside the firm (e.g., volunteering engagement), followed by theory
on how it can affect multiple aspects of employee behavior inside the firm (e.g., work
productivity and altruistic behavior).
The Level of Volunteering Support and Employee Volunteering Engagement
The first purpose of my study is to examine whether and how providing different
levels of volunteering support affects employees’ altruistic behavior outside the firm via
volunteering engagement. Although current compensation trends suggest that offering
support for employee volunteering is one of the fastest-growing areas of employee
benefits (Glassdoor 2017; Bengtson 2020; Deloitte 2020), surprisingly little is understood
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about the effectiveness of these volunteering programs on employee volunteering
engagement.
Recent accounting research focuses on the effects of work design (e.g., incentive
scheme and task difficulty) on employees’ altruistic behavior outside the firm and
suggests that work design can facilitate or hinder individual employee volunteering
(Newman, Tafkov, and Zhou 2020). Relatedly, a theoretical framework proposed by
Rodell et al. (2016) suggests that employees’ perceived autonomy in terms of work time
and pay structure likely influences their decisions about time use, because the economic
value of their time can vary depending on these work design factors. Providing time off
for volunteering is likely to weaken the economic considerations associated with
employee time use (DeVoe and Pfeffer 2007), thus, allowing individuals to weigh the
social benefits associated with volunteering more heavily and more freely. As a result, I
expect providing VTO will promote employees’ engagement in volunteering activities.3
Further, I expect that compared to providing VTO only, providing extra monetary
support in addition to time support (VTO + matching grant) will have extra benefits in
terms of promoting employee volunteering engagement. First, by “putting their money
where their mouth is,” dual support in the form of time and money signals a higher level
of explicit firm support for employee volunteering, and thus should generally induce
higher employee motivation to engage in firm approved behavior by acting in line with
firm’s value (Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2015). Second, by adding a financial incentive to
an existing social incentive, providing a matching grant in addition to VTO magnifies the

3

Volunteering engagement could manifest in multiple ways such as likelihood to volunteer, time spent on
volunteering, or volunteering output. For the sake of brevity, I keep my discussion of volunteering
engagement in this section at the theoretical level and examine the various forms of manifestations further
in my Results section.
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perceived positive impact on the beneficiaries, thus making employees more aware of the
positive impact their actions have on others (e.g., the charities). Such quantifiable impact
and awareness likely further increase the utility and subjective meaning employees place
on altruistic behavior outside the firm. Thus, my first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: Employee volunteering engagement is higher when VTO is present and
the firm provides a matching grant, than when only VTO is present.
The Level of Volunteering Support and Employee Behavior Inside the Firm
While firms seek to design employee volunteering programs to best support
external CSR objectives, they ultimately need to understand and be aware of the
consequences these programs might have on internal business objectives. Therefore, in
this section, I theorize how the level of volunteering support can affect two types of
employee behavior inside the firm: employee work productivity and altruistic behavior
inside the firm.
Employee Work Productivity
An emerging stream of accounting research studies the effectiveness of charitable
incentives on employee effort focusing primarily on monetary donations (Balakrishnan et
al. 2011; Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2015; Douthit et al. 2021; Johnson et al. 2021).
Overall, this research finds consistent evidence suggesting that workplace giving to
charitable causes can increase firm-related employee effort across different forms of
monetary donations (e.g., direct corporate giving, employee earning a bonus for charities,
corporate matching of employees’ charitable donations). For example, Balakrishnan et al.
(2011) find that firms can benefit from money-based corporate giving because by
donating a portion of employees’ contribution to charities, employees contribute more to
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the firm. Similarly, Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2015) find that charitable donations result in
a 13% increase in employee productivity, and the motivational value comes from the
presence of charitable incentives rather than their magnitude. Most recently, Douthit et al.
(2021) find that corporate matching of employees’ donations induces even more effort
than direct corporate giving.
Although prior research generally documents a positive effect of giving money, it
is premature to assume that the results based on monetary donations will automatically
hold for time-based donations. People generally make decisions about time and money
differently, because compared to money, time is more perishable, less fungible, and
impossible to store for a later use (Okda and Hoch 2004). Thus, when employees give
time to charities via VTO, the value they place on, and the utility they derive from timebased giving will likely differ from that of money-based giving documented in prior
research (e.g., Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Douthit et al. 2021).
From an economic standpoint, the time-insensitive nature of salaried
compensation is likely to make giving time to volunteer seem “less costly” to employees,
because this time is already guaranteed to be compensated by the employer who bears the
opportunity cost associated with employee volunteering. From a psychological
perspective, providing VTO under salaried compensation likely communicates two things
to employees. One, the employer is committed to supporting charitable causes that are
personally important to employees. Two, the employer trusts them to manage their own
work time. Behavioral theory of reciprocity suggests that when employees feel trusted,
they are likely to reciprocate with higher levels of trust and effort (Gambetta 1988;
Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2012). Moreover, from employees’ perspective, VTO likely

12

induces higher moral satisfaction, and thus increases the meaning they ascribe to their
work, and consequently their motivation to perform inside the firm (Kahneman and
Knetsch 1992; Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and Ganapathi 2007; Balakrishnan et al. 2011;
Tonin and Vlassopoulos 2015). Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that providing
VTO under salaried compensation will motivate higher employee effort inside the firm
relative to no volunteering support, even though there is no economic incentive to
increase effort. Formally, I present the following hypothesis:
H2a: Employee work productivity is higher when VTO is present than when
VTO is absent.
Perceived firm support is important to employees’ understanding of what the
employer values (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Korschun, Bhattacharya, and Swain 2014;
Douthit et al. 2021). Adding a matching grant in addition to VTO communicates more
strongly to employees that the firm shares their social values and supports their moral
aspirations with greater firm commitment. From a management control perspective,
shared values also have the advantage of being relatively unobtrusive, compared to other
forms of cultural controls (e.g., codes of conduct). That is, employees are less likely to
think of the shared value with the employer as a type of “control.” From a social
exchange perspective, reciprocity suggests that individuals are likely to reciprocate and
reward a kind action with an equivalent level of return (e.g., Gouldner 1960; Uhl-Bien
and Maslyn 2003). Thus, providing dual support of time and money is likely to more
strongly convey to employees that the employer is kind to them, and thus induce a higher
level of reciprocity with the employer. Similarly, dual support of time and money is
likely to further enhance employees’ moral satisfaction related to their work and increase
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their motivation to perform inside the firm. Taken together, I predict that as the level of
firm support for employee volunteering increases, employees’ motivation to perform
inside the firm will also increase. Formally, I state the following hypothesis:
H2b: Employee work productivity is higher when VTO is present and the
firm provides a matching grant than when only VTO is present.
Employee Altruistic Behavior Inside the Firm
The last purpose of my study is to examine the potential spillover effects from
employees’ volunteering externally on their altruistic behavior internally. While altruistic
behavior outside the firm can have CSR-related benefits (e.g., corporate reputation,
customer attraction, recruiting), altruistic behavior toward other employees inside the
firm can also play a critical role in internal business operations (e.g., William and
Anderson 1991; P. Podsakoff, Whiting, N. Podsakoff, and Blume 2009; Black 2020).
However, internal altruistic behavior can be difficult to motivate because extra-role
performance cannot be perfectly anticipated, monitored, or measured, and thus contracted
in advance (Holmstrom 1979; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Sprinkle 2003; Hecht,
Tafkov, and Towry 2012). In this section, I develop theory to predict how the level of
volunteering support for charitable causes outside the firm can spill over to affect
employees’ altruistic behavior toward coworkers.4
Employees form their understanding of firm culture based on their job design and
work environment and then incorporate this information into how they approach their
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Altruistic behavior towards coworkers and altruistic behavior towards the firm are two distinct constructs
(Williams and Anderson 1991; Lee and Allen 2002). In this study, my focus is on the altruistic behavior
towards other coworkers. The extent to which such altruism also benefits the firm is beyond the scope of
my study.
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work (e.g., Grant 2007; Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Black, Newman, Stikeleather, and
Waddoups 2019). For example, Balakrishnan et al. (2011) document that employees take
the level of firm giving as a cue for the firm’s prosocial identity and adjust their work
behavior accordingly. Compared to when VTO is absent, providing VTO sends a positive
signal of the firm’s prosocial identity by sharing the opportunity cost associated with
employee volunteering (i.e., forgone work time and output). In such a work context,
employees’ tendency to help others is more likely to be activated, and thus employees are
more likely to embrace the firm’s prosocial identity by acting consistently and
altruistically toward another employee.5 Similarly, Merchant and Van der Stede (2017)
state that one of the distinctive advantages of firm culture over other types of controls is
that once activated, cultural controls can have lasting influence on other aspects of
employee behavior.
Further, moral consistency theory (Susewind and Hoelzl 2014; Mullen and Monin
2016) suggests that employee volunteering likely activates positive spillover from
charitable activities outside the firm to altruistic behavior inside the firm. Prior research
(Gneezy et al. 2012; Mullen and Monin 2016) suggests that costly initial altruistic
behavior such as spending time and effort to volunteer for a charitable cause is more
likely to be perceived as diagnostic about the self, leading employees to embrace the
prosocial value indicated by that behavior in subsequent actions, resulting in moral

5

This prediction is based on behavioral theory, given that I am interested in a setting that allows me to
clearly test the behavioral effects of firms offering varying levels of volunteering support. From an
economic standpoint, employees face no immediate economic benefit for helping a fellow coworker, while
there is often a cost associated with helping (e.g., forgone leisure time, time could be spent working for
oneself). To the extent that employees face stronger economic incentives to act self-servingly, this could
change the relative weight they place on social versus economic motives. Ultimately, how employees
would trade-off economic versus social motives and factors that influence this tradeoff are empirical
questions beyond the scope of the current study.
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consistency. Because of the time and effort involved, VTO is likely to prime employees
to view themselves as altruistic individuals (Gneezy et al. 2012), and thus increase their
tendency to help others. Taken together, the above discussion suggests that compared to
when VTO is absent, providing firm support for VTO externally likely spills over to
positively influence employees’ altruistic behavior internally. Formally stated, my next
hypothesis is as follows:
H3a: Employees’ altruistic behavior inside the firm is higher when VTO is
present than when VTO is absent.
Finally, I expect that providing extra monetary support in addition to time support
(VTO + matching grant) is unlikely to have extra benefits in terms of promoting
employee altruistic behavior inside the firm, compared to VTO only; although such extra
benefits are expected in terms of employee volunteering engagement (H1) and work
productivity (H2b). First, mental accounting (Thaler 1999) suggests that individuals
combine associated outcomes into the same mental account and evaluate them jointly.
The closer the association between outcomes, the greater the likelihood the outcomes will
be evaluated jointly. Altruistic behavior inside the firm often involves time (e.g., helping
a coworker or undertaking an additional task that is often time-consuming but not directly
rewarded). Given that people create and maintain mental accounts for time as they do for
money (Rajagopal and Rha 2009), when individuals already spend time from the same
“altruistic mental account” to help others externally via volunteering, their mental budget
left for time-based internal altruistic behavior is likely to be smaller, even if this account
is activated by VTO. Thus, once activated, their altruistic behavior inside the firm is
unlikely to continue to increase as the level of firm support for employee volunteering
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increases (i.e., employees’ “altruistic mental account” satiates).6 Accordingly, I predict
that the presence of volunteering support, but not the level of volunteering support will
positively impact employees’ altruistic behavior inside the firm. I state my last hypothesis
as follows:
H3b: There is no difference in employee altruistic behavior inside the firm
when VTO is present and the firm provides a matching grant
compared to when only VTO is present.
To summarize, I predict that relative to providing VTO only, providing a
matching grant in addition to VTO will positively affect employees’ volunteering
engagement outside the firm, as well as employee work productivity inside the firm.
However, regarding employee altruistic behavior inside the firm, I expect that although
the presence of volunteering support can serve as an activation tool, and thus spill over to
positively influence employee behavior, the level of firm support is less consequential.

Reciprocity is unlikely to influence employees’ altruistic behavior towards a coworker because in my
study, the first mover of the kind action is the firm rather than the coworker (Rabin 1993; Douthit et al.
2021).
6
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Experimental Design and Task Description
To test my hypotheses, I conduct a laboratory experiment using a 1 × 3 betweensubjects design.7 I manipulate firm support for employee volunteering at three levels:
VTO absent, VTO present, and VTO + matching grant. The experiment consists of two
stages. In the first stage, participants individually work on a real-effort task (described
below) for three rounds with each round lasting five minutes. Volunteering happens in
the middle round, as described later. In the second stage, participants have an opportunity
to help a coworker with their task for up to five minutes. The second stage of the
experiment occurs after the completion of the first stage and is entirely voluntary. In
addition to a $5.00 show-up fee, participants receive a fixed wage of $5.00 for
completing the task.
For the primary real-effort task, I adapt a version of the letter search task where
participants count the number of times a specific “search letter” appears within a letter
box (Sprinkle, Williamson, and Upton 2008; Webb, Williamson, and Zhang 2013;
Kachelmeier, Thornock, and Williamson 2016; Choi, Clark, and Presslee 2019; Newman,
Tafkov, Waddoups, and Xiong 2021). Figure 3.1 shows an example of the letter search
task. I use a 1 x 1 letter grid (thus the correct answer is always either “0” or “1”) to

7

The experimental design received approval from the University’s Institutional Review Board.
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facilitate a finer measure of performance while limiting task strategies beyond exerting
effort (Choi et al. 2019). I also include a three-second penalty for each incorrect answer
to further discourage participants from pursuing a guessing strategy rather than exerting
effort. A timer in the top right corner of the computer screen counts down the time
remaining for each of the five-minute rounds. The top left corner of the computer screen
shows participants, in real-time, the number of boxes they have correctly completed in
each round.
I manipulate firm support for employee volunteering at three levels. In the VTO
present condition, participants are told that the employer they work for supports
employee volunteering. Thus, during the second round of the first-stage task, they can
take time off from their regular work time to volunteer for a charity of their choice.
Specifically, instead of working, they can choose to take up to five minutes (in oneminute intervals) to volunteer for a charity of their choice. The charitable activity is
typing personal messages (on a blank digital greeting card) to encourage kids in a
children’s hospital, thank food bank heroes who help Americans who are struggling with
hunger, or thank animal rescue heroes who are fighting against cruelty to animals (See
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3).8 In the VTO + matching grant condition, participants are told
that in addition to VTO, the employer matches each minute they volunteer with a $0.25
donation to the same charity (See Figure 3.4). 9 10 In the VTO absent condition,

8

The word limit is set to 140 characters per greeting card and participants can write as many cards as they
wish within their chosen volunteering time.
9
I set the matching grant at $0.25 per minute because it is easy for participants to process. In practice, the
matching grant for VTO ranges from $15 to $25 per hour (Volunteer Grant Basics 2021), which is similar
to $0.25 per minute. In addition, $0.25 is lower than employees’ average pay of $0.33 per minute ($5 for a
15-minute work period), thus making it less likely to backfire and cause potential negative employee
responses (Douthit, Mao, and Martin 2022).
10
All the volunteering work (380 greeting cards) and matching grants ($34.75) were sent to the
corresponding charities.
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participants do not receive any of this information about the charities nor are they given
the opportunity to volunteer during their allotted work time. Instead, to hold constant the
presence of a choice as well as the opportunity to opt out of some of their available work
time across conditions, participants in the VTO absent condition are given the
opportunity to take a break for up to five-minutes (in one-minute intervals) during the
second round by either 1) sitting quietly, 2) reading jokes, or 3) playing a word game.
For the second stage task, I adapt a modified version of the dictator game which
provides participants an opportunity to help a coworker with the letter search task (See
Figure 3.5 for an example).11 The purpose of the second stage task is to capture timebased employee altruism inside the firm. The second stage task lasts up to five minutes
and is entirely voluntary. Specifically, after the completion of the first stage primary task,
participants are told that they can 1) finish early by skipping the second stage task
altogether and proceeding directly to the post experimental questionnaire; 2) help a
coworker who is also completing the study in the same session; or 3) work for themselves
to improve their overall performance on the letter search task.12 Those who choose to
help internally have up to five minutes (in one-minute intervals) to help a coworker with
their letter search task (See Figure 3.6).

11

The dictator game is often used to measure altruistic behavior in a laboratory environment (e.g.,
Carpenter, Connolly, and Myers 2008; Simpson and Willer 2008; Engel 2011; Filkowski, Cochran, and
Hass 2016). The dictator game is composed by two players: the dictator and the receiver. The dictator is
generally endowed with a pool of resources (e.g., five minutes). Her task is to decide how much, if any, of
this pool of resources to pass to the receiver. Thus, the dictator has the decision rights over time spent on
self-interests versus altruism.
12
The order of these three choices is randomized to avoid any order effect.
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Participants and Procedures
In total 142 undergraduate students from business classes at a large public
university in the United States participate in the experiment across six sessions.
Participants, on average, are 19.27 years old and have 25.01 months of work experience.
46 percent of the participants are female. There are no significant differences across
conditions for age, gender, GPA, or work experience (untabulated; all p > 0.169, twotailed).13
I run two 45-minute sessions per condition and randomly pre-determine which
condition is used for each session. Upon arrival, participants are assigned a unique 5character participant ID which is used to receive individual feedback throughout the
experiment and claim final payout. The flow of the experimental procedures is presented
in Figure 3.7. Prior to the first stage task, participants receive instructions on their
computers regarding the procedure, the real-effort task, their opportunity to volunteer
during their allotted work time in the first stage (based on their experimental conditions),
and their pay structure. Participants are asked to follow the instructions as the
experimenter reads them aloud. Next, participants complete a 60-second practice period
to familiarize themselves with the primary letter search task and then read background
information about the charities (Humane Society International, St. Jude Children’s

Further, there are no significant differences across conditions for participants’ personal prosocial identity
(untabulated; F = 1.475, p = 0.232, two-tailed). To measure participants’ prosocial identify, I use an
established three-item measure (Grant, Dutton, and Rosso 2008) in which participants rate their agreement
with the following three statements on a 7-point Likert scale (-3 = strongly disagree, +3 = strongly agree):
1) I see myself as helpful; 2) I see myself as caring; and 3) I regularly help others. A factor analysis using
the three Likert scale responses revealed that one factor, with Eigenvalue of 2.34, explaining 78 percent of
the variance, with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86. Thus, I use the average score across the three measures to test
participants’ personal prosocial identity across the three conditions.
13
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Research Hospital, and Feeding America) if applicable.14 Then, participants are required
to correctly answer several comprehension-quiz questions to ensure their understanding
of the instructions. In the VTO present and VTO + matching grant conditions,
participants are asked to indicate whether they would like to spend some of their allotted
work time to volunteer for one of the charities (See Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4 for more
details). If so, they choose which charity and how long they are willing to volunteer for
the charity (ranging from one to five minutes), before proceeding to the first stage of the
primary work period. Similarly, those in the VTO absent condition indicate whether they
want to take a break during the second round and if so, how long and what type of break
they prefer (i.e., sitting quietly, reading jokes, or playing a word game).15
The second stage of the experiment occurs upon completion of the first stage of
the three-round primary task. In the second stage, participants have the opportunity to
choose to help a coworker. Participants are told that each minute they spend working on
the letter search task during the second stage will result in a small increase to a
coworker’s $10 take-home pay.16 However, their helping choice is independent of

14

Prior to running my main experiment, I conduct an out-of-sample survey with 42 participants from a
similar participant pool to determine three charitable causes to include in my experiment. Participants rate
their likelihood to volunteer for each charity on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 = Unlikely to volunteer, 7 = Very
likely to volunteer) for six charities that currently offer workplace giving partnership opportunities with
companies: St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, Feeding America, Humane Society International, Foster
Kids Charity, Meals on Wheels, the Salvation Army. The three charities for which participants are most
likely to volunteer are: 1) Humane Society International (with an average rating of 5.71); 2) St. Jude
Children’s Research Hospital (with an average rating of 5.52), and 3) Feeding America (with an average
rating of 5.24). These three charity ratings are significantly higher than the other three alternatives (all p <
0.033). Thus, I include these three charities in my VTO manipulation to proxy for the availability of
multiple choices in practice while still making it manageable in an experimental setting.
15
Those who opt-in to volunteering (taking a break) during their allotted work time are taken to a separate
window at the start of the second round to volunteer (take a break) instead of working. When their chosen
volunteer (break) time is over, participants are automatically directed back to the primary task screen and
continue working on the letter search task for any time remaining in the second round before proceeding to
the third and last round of the first stage task.
16
I purposefully did not reveal the $0.25 per minute rate to participants to 1) reduce potential noise related
to the relative positive impact of external vs. internal altruistic activities influencing participant behavior; 2)
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whether they will be helped by someone else. I make this clear to rule out reciprocity
concerns and to ensure that my manipulation of volunteering support is influencing
internal altruistic behavior instead of strategic considerations (e.g., implicit
coordination).17 Alternatively, participants can finish early or work for themselves to
improve their overall performance on the letter search task. After the second stage task,
participants complete the post experimental questionnaire where process variables and
demographic information are collected. Finally, participants receive their compensation.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable used to test Hypothesis 1 is participants’ volunteering
engagement, measured by their tendency to volunteer, time spent volunteering, and
volunteering output in terms of the number of greeting cards sent to charities. The
dependent variable used to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b is employee work productivity,
measured by dividing the total number of correct letter boxes participants complete
during the first stage by the number of minutes participants spend on the letter search
task, net of any time spent volunteering / taking a break (Webb et al. 2013). In order to
compare across conditions, I standardize the employee work productivity measure to
account for differences in the amount of time participants spend working (e.g., 10
minutes vs. 15 minutes) during the first stage. The dependent variable used to test
Hypotheses 3a and 3b is participants’ altruistic behavior inside the firm, measured by
their tendency to help a coworker and the time they spent helping a coworker during the
second stage altruism task.

generalize to work settings in which the specific impact of helping may not be readily known or directly
measurable.
17
Without being known by participants, I adopt the “pay it forward” altruistic chain in which the help
provided by a participant benefits another participant with the very next participant ID.
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FIGURE 3.1: The First Stage – Primary Letter Search Task

24

FIGURE 3.2: Manipulation of VTO Present
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FIGURE 3.3: Example of the Volunteer Task
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FIGURE 3.4: Manipulation of VTO + Matching Grant
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FIGURE 3.5: The Second Stage: Altruism Task – Part A
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FIGURE 3.6: The Second Stage: Altruism Task – Part B
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FIGURE 3.7: Experimental Procedure
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
I first discuss descriptive statistics for my three dependent variables and then test
my hypotheses. Table 4.1 provides a list of all variables used in this section. For
expositional consistency with my theoretical development, I refer to participants as
“employees” throughout the Results section.
Consistent with the pattern I predict in H1, Panel A of Table 4.2 shows that
increasing the level of firm support for employee volunteering appears to increase
employees’ volunteering engagement in terms of their tendency to volunteer (78% vs.
75%), time (in minutes) spent on volunteering (3.86 vs. 3.31), average volunteering
output (6.53 vs. 3.58), and per minute volunteering output (1.81 vs. 0.96), in the number
of greeting cards sent to charity. Figure 4.1 presents a graphical representation of these
results.
Regarding employee behaviors inside the firm, Panel A of Table 4.3 provides
descriptive results for employee work productivity across the three conditions. Consistent
with H2b, providing a higher level of firm support for employee volunteering (VTO +
matching grant) appears to motivate higher employee work productivity inside the firm
compared to only providing VTO (VTO present), when considering all employees (50.71
vs. 48.01), and especially when only considering those who chose to volunteer (51.26 vs.
48.36). However, inconsistent with H2a, VTO by itself does not seem to impact
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employee work productivity compared to when VTO is absent when considering all
employees (48.01 vs. 49.47), or only those who chose to volunteer (48.36 vs. 48.94).
Figure 4.2 presents a graphical representation of these results.
Further, consistent with the pattern of spillover effect I predicted in H3a, Panel A
of Table 4.4 shows that there appears to be a positive spillover from the firm’s
volunteering support externally to employees’ altruistic behavior internally across two
meaningful outcomes: 1) their tendency to help a coworker (60% vs. 35%), and 2) time
they spend helping a coworker (2.19 vs. 1.35). Lastly, consistent with the pattern I
predicted in H3b, providing a matching grant seems to have less of a positive effect when
it comes to employee altruistic behavior inside the firm, both in terms of 1) their tendency
to help a coworker (70% vs. 60%), and 2) time spent helping a coworker (2.76 vs. 2.19).
Figure 4.3 presents a graphical representation of these results. Overall, except for H2a,
these descriptive results appear consistent with my theoretical predictions.
Tests of Hypotheses - Employee Volunteering Engagement (H1)
I now formally test whether providing a higher level of volunteering support
(VTO + matching grant) is effective in promoting employee volunteering engagement,
compared to providing VTO only (H1). Consistent with the positive effect predicted in
H1, Panel B of Table 4.2 shows that compared to when only VTO is present, employee
volunteering engagement is significantly higher in two meaningful ways when the firm
also provides a matching grant. One, although providing a matching grant did not
significantly increase employees’ tendency to volunteer (78% vs. 75%, t = 0.370, p =
0.356);18 employees who do volunteer spend significantly more time volunteering (3.86

18

All reported p-values are two-tailed for non-directional predictions and one-tailed for directional
predictions.
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vs. 3.31, t = 2.057, p = 0.022). Two, employees who do volunteer not only generate
significantly more volunteering output for charities on average (6.53 vs. 3.58, t = 1.727, p
= 0.044), but also generate significantly more volunteering output per minute (1.81 vs.
0.96, t = 1.589, p = 0.058). Figure 4.4 provides an example of the volunteering output for
each of the three charities. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, participants took the volunteering
activities seriously and wrote thoughtful messages to the charities. Taken together, these
results provide support for H1, suggesting that adding a matching grant is effective in
promoting employee volunteering.
A potential alternative explanation is that employees use VTO as a chance to take
a break from their productive task. To rule out this alternative explanation, the VTO
absent condition allows employees to take a break. Additional analysis shows that in the
VTO absent condition, only 35% of employees take a break even when given the choice
to do so, which is significantly lower than the 75% (78%) of employees who volunteer
during the allotted time in the VTO present (VTO + matching grant) condition
(untabulated; all p < 0.001). To further rule out the possibility that employees view VTO
as a chance to take a break from their regular work, I ask them to rate their agreement
with the statement “I would be less likely to take a break (volunteer for a charity) as my
work becomes more enjoyable” on a 7-point Likert scale (-3 = strongly disagree, +3 =
strongly agree). Compared to the midpoint, untabulated results show that when VTO is
absent, employees are significantly less likely to take a break as their work becomes more
enjoyable (mean = 1.83, t = 7.504, p < 0.001). However, when VTO is present,
employees are not less likely to volunteer as their work becomes more enjoyable (mean =
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-0.67, t = -2.770, p = 0.004). This is true regardless of whether the firm provides a
matching grant in addition to VTO (mean = -0.78, t = -2.685, p = 0.005) or not. Taken
together, these results rule out the alternative explanation that employees use VTO as a
chance to take a break from their work or they will only volunteer when their work is less
enjoyable.
Tests of Hypotheses - Employee Work Productivity (H2a and H2b)
My next set of hypotheses focuses on employee work productivity inside the firm.
H2a predicts that employee work productivity is higher when VTO is present than when
VTO is absent. In contrast to this prediction, Panel B of Table 4.3 shows that compared
to when VTO is absent, employee work productivity is similar (48.01 vs. 49.47, t =
1.051, p = 0.148) when the firm provides only VTO. This result does not change when
examining only employees who chose to volunteer when VTO is present (48.36 vs.
48.94, t = 0.284, p = 0.389). Thus, H2a is not supported, suggesting that VTO by itself
does not impact employee work productivity compared to when VTO is absent.19
H2b predicts that employee work productivity is higher when VTO is present and
the firm provides a matching grant, relative to when only VTO is present. Panel C of
Table 4.3 shows that compared to when only VTO is present, employee work
productivity for all employees is marginally higher (50.71 vs. 48.01, t = 1.444, p = 0.076)

19

A potential explanation for the null result of H2a is that the option to take a break in the VTO absent
condition also invokes a reciprocal response, although this design choice allows me to hold the mental
break option constant across all conditions. To better understand this null result, I examine the 2 reciprocity
measures which ask participants to rate “To what extent did the opportunity to take a break [volunteer for
charity] in Round 2 affect the effort you exert on the production task” in Round 1 and Round 3 respectively
(-3 = greatly decreased; +3 = greatly increased). Untabulated results show that although participants’
average reciprocity ratings are significantly above the mid-point 0 in both conditions, there is no difference
in the average reciprocity measures between the VTO absent and the VTO present condition (0.55 vs. 0.81,
t = 1.362, p = 0.176). This result suggests that participants also positively reciprocated in the VTO Absent
condition when the firm gave them the option to take a break.
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when the firm also provides a matching grant. This result is even more pronounced when
examining only employees that chose to volunteer in the VTO + matching grant
condition (51.26 vs. 48.36, t = 1.662, p = 0.050).20 Taken together, these results provide
support for H2b, suggesting that providing extra support for employee volunteering
externally in the form of a matching grant boosts employees’ work productivity
internally.
Tests of Hypotheses - Employee Altruistic Behavior Inside the Firm (H3a and H3b)
Lastly, I examine whether the firm’s support for employee volunteering externally
spills over to affect employee altruistic behavior internally. H3a predicts that employees’
altruistic behavior inside the firm is higher when VTO is present than when VTO is
absent. Consistent with this prediction, Panel B of Table 4.4 shows that compared to
when VTO is absent, employees’ helping behavior toward their coworkers is significantly
higher in two meaningful ways when the firm provides VTO. One, providing VTO
significantly increases employees’ tendency to help their coworkers (60% vs. 35%, t =
2.506, p = 0.007). Two, employees also spend significantly more time helping their
coworkers (2.19 vs. 1.35, t = 2.035, p = 0.022).21 Further, Panel B of Table 4.5 shows that
those results are even more pronounced when examining only the employees who chose

20

H2a and H2b results do not change if I only examine employee work productivity in the post-VTO
period (i.e., Round 3). Specifically, untabulated results show that there is no significant difference in
employee work productivity in the post-VTO period between the VTO absent condition and the VTO
present condition for all employees (50.92 vs. 50.15, t = 0.493, p = 0.311) or only for those who actually
volunteered /took a break (50.39 vs. 50.51, t = 0.055, p = 0.478). However, there is a significant difference
in employee work productivity between the VTO present condition and VTO + matching grant condition
for all employees (50.15 vs. 52.78, t = 1.374, p = 0.086) or only those who actually volunteered (50.51 vs.
53.46, t = 1.620, p = 0.055).
21
My results are inferentially identical if I use helping output (i.e., the average number of correct letter
boxes participants complete for a coworker) as the dependent measure for employees’ altruistic behavior
inside the firm. Specifically, in addition to being more likely help to help a coworker and spend more time
to help a coworker, participants in the VTO present condition also produce significantly more output for
their coworkers (untabulated; 114.35 vs. 76.67, t = 1.644, p = 0.052) than those in the VTO absent
condition.
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to volunteer externally during the first stage. Taken together, the above results provide
support for H3a, suggesting that providing support for employee volunteering externally
can spillover to positively influence employee altruistic behavior internally.
H3b predicts that there is no difference in employee altruistic behavior inside the
firm when VTO is present and the firm provides a matching grant compared to when only
VTO is present (i.e., the level of volunteering support does not matter when it comes to
the positive spillover effect on employee altruistic behavior internally). Consistent with
this prediction, Panel C of Table 4.4 shows that compared to when only VTO is present,
employees’ helping behavior toward their coworkers is not significantly greater when the
firm provides a matching grant in addition to VTO. Specifically, providing an extra
matching grant: 1) does not significantly increase employees’ tendency to help their
coworkers (70% vs. 60%, t = 0.923, p = 0.358); and 2) does not significantly increase the
time employees spend helping their coworkers (2.76 vs. 2.19, t = 1.337, p = 0.185).22
Panel C of Table 4.5 shows that these results hold even when examining only the
employees that chose to volunteer during the first stage. Taken together, the above results
provide support for H3b, suggesting that although the presence of volunteering support
spills over to positively influence employees’ internal altruistic behavior, the level of firm
support is less consequential.
To better understand these results, I measure employees’ moral consistency by
asking those employees who volunteered in the first stage task to rate their agreement

22

Again, my results are inferentially identical if I use helping output (i.e., the average number of correct
letter boxes participants complete for a coworker) as the dependent measure for employees’ altruistic
behavior inside the firm. Specifically, in addition to having a similar tendency to help a coworker and
spend a similar amount of time on helping a coworker, participants in the VTO + matching grant condition
also did not generate significantly more output for their coworkers (untabulated; 152.48 vs. 114.35, t =
1.595, p = 0.114) than those in the VTO present condition.
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with the statement “To what extent did the time you spent volunteering affect your
willingness to help a coworker on their letter search task?” on a 7-point Likert scale (-3 =
greatly decreased, +3 = greatly increased). Consistent with my theoretical expectation
that costly initial altruistic behavior such as volunteering for a charity will result in moral
consistency behavior, untabulated results show that the time employees spent on
volunteering externally significantly increased their willingness to help a coworker on the
second stage task (untabulated; t = 7.961, p < 0.001). However, whether or not the firm
provides a matching grant does not make a difference (untabulated; 1.17 vs. 1.11, t =
0.193, p = 0.848).
Further, to capture employees’ perceptions of the firm’s prosocial identity, I use a
two-item measure (Cassar and Meier 2017) via which employees rate their agreement
with the following two statements on a 7-point Likert scale (-3 = strongly disagree, +3 =
strongly agree): 1) I think The Company cares about charitable causes; and 2) I think The
Company is kind to its employees. Using the average score across the two measures,
untabulated results show that consistent with my expectation that employees take the
level of firm support as a cue for the firm’s prosocial identity, when VTO is present,
employees perceive a significantly higher prosocial identity of the firm compared to
when VTO is absent (untabulated; 1.03 vs. 1.80, p < 0.001). Moreover, providing a
matching grant in addition to VTO does not significantly alter employees’ perception of
the firm’s prosocial identity relative to when only VTO is present (untabulated; 2.04 vs.
1.80, p = 0.288). Collectively, the analyses above suggest that the positive spillover effect
from external volunteering to internal altruistic behavior is driven by moral consistency
and employees’ perception of the firm’s prosocial identity.
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Overall Performance
Lastly, to provide insights into the overall performance implications of providing
varying levels of firm support for employee volunteering on employee work behavior
inside the firm, I examine employees’ overall performance in terms of total correct output
generated from both stages (i.e., first stage primary task and second stage altruism task).
Untabulated results show that there is no significant difference in overall performance
across all three conditions (791.58 vs. 736.33 vs. 768.67, p ≥ 0.172), despite the
opportunity cost of time incurred for volunteering outside the firm rather than working
inside the firm during the primary task. From a firm’s perspective, this is an important
insight because my results suggest that taking into account the potential spillover effects
of employee volunteering on extra-role work behavior (such as helping a coworker),
there may not be a significant productivity loss as intuition would suggest regarding the
opportunity cost of time incurred for VTO. While at the same time, there are wellestablished benefits associated with corporate philanthropy (e.g., Elfenbein et al. 2012;
Kitzmueller and Shimshack 2012; Lins et al. 2017; Hartzmark and Sussman2019).
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TABLE 4.1: Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

Tendency to Volunteer

The percentage of employees who choose to volunteer in
Round 2 in the VTO Present and the VTO + Matching
Grant (VTO Absent) condition.

Time Spent Volunteering

Average time in minutes employees spend on
volunteering in the VTO Present and the VTO +
Matching Grant condition.

Total Volunteering Output

The number of greeting cards with personal message
employees write to encourage kids in a children’s
hospital, thanking food bank heroes who help Americans
who are struggling with hunger, or thanking animal
rescue heroes who are fighting against cruelty to
animals.

Per Minute Volunteering Output

The number of greeting cards with personal message
employees write to charities per minute.

Employee Work Productivity

Dividing the total number of correct letter boxes
employees complete during the first stage by the number
of minutes participants spend on the letter search task in
the first stage, net of any time they spend
volunteering/taking a break.

Tendency to Help

The percentage of employees choose to help a coworker
in the second stage.

Time Spent on Helping

Average time in minutes employees spend helping a
coworker in the second stage.

Helping Output

Average number of correct letter boxes employees
complete for a coworker during the second stage.
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TABLE 4.2: Employee Volunteering Engagement
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics − Mean (Std. Deviation)
Dependent
Variable

VTO Present

Tendency to
Volunteer

75%
(0.44)
n = 48

VTO + Matching
Grant
78%
(0.42)
n = 46

Time Spent
Volunteering

3.31
(1.04)
n = 36

3.86
(1.25)
n = 36

Total
Volunteering Output

3.58
(3.75)
n = 36

6.53
(9.52)
n = 36

Per Minute
Volunteering Output

0.96
(0.81)
n = 36

1.81
(3.12)
n = 36

Panel B: Tests of Hypothesis (H1)
VTO Present
versus
VTO + Matching
Grant
Tendency to
Volunteer

df

Mean
Difference

t

p-value

92

3%

0.370

0.356

Time Spent
Volunteering

70

0.56

2.057

0.022

Total
Volunteering Output

70

2.94

1.727

0.044

Per Minute
Volunteering Output

70

0.85

1.589

0.058

See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 4.3: Employee Work Productivity
Panel A

Descriptive Statistics − Mean (Std. Deviation)
VTO
Absent
49.47
(6.70)
n = 48

VTO
Present
48.01
(6.95)
n = 48

VTO + Matching
Grant
50.71
(10.88)
n = 46

48.94
(6.45)

48.36
(7.13)

51.26
(7.69)

n = 17

n = 36

n = 36

df

Mean
Difference

t

p-value

94

1.46

1.051

0.148

51

0.58

0.284

0.389

t

p-value

1.444

0.076

1.662

0.050

Dependent Variable
Employee Work
Productivity
(All Employees)
Employee Work
Productivity
(Employees
Volunteered/
Took a Break Only)
Panel B

Tests of Hypotheses (H2a)

VTO Present
versus
VTO Absent
Employee Work
Productivity
(All Employees)
Employee Work
Productivity
(Employees
Volunteered/
Took a Break Only)

Panel C Tests of Hypotheses (H2b)
VTO Present
versus
Mean
df
VTO + Matching
Difference
Grant
Employee work
productivity
92
2.71
(All Employees )
Employee work
productivity
(Employees
Volunteered/
Took a Break Only)

70

2.91

See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 4.4: Employee Altruistic Behavior Inside the Firm - All Employees
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics − Mean (Std. Deviation)
Dependent
Variable

VTO Absent

VTO Present

Tendency to
Help

35%
(0.48)
n = 48

60%
(0.49)
n = 48

VTO +
Matching
Grant
70%
(0.47)
n = 46

Time Spent
Helping

1.35
(1.98)
n = 48

2.19
(2.03)
n = 48

2.76
(2.13)
n = 46

Panel B: Tests of Hypothesis (H3a)
VTO Present
versus
VTO Absent
Tendency to
Help
Time Spent
Helping

df

Mean
Difference

t

p-value

94

25%

2.506

0.007

94

0.83

2.035

0.022

t

p-value

0.923

0.358

1.337

0.185

Panel C: Tests of Hypothesis (H3b)
VTO Present
versus
Mean
df
VTO +
Difference
Matching Grant
Tendency to
92
9%
Help
Time Spent
Helping

92

0.57

See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 4.5: Employee Altruistic Behavior Inside the Firm-Volunteered/Took a
Break Only
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics − Mean (Std. Deviation)
Dependent
Variable

VTO Absent

VTO Present

Tendency to
Help

29%
(0.47)
n = 17

67%
(0.48)
n = 36

VTO +
Matching
Grant
75%
(0.44)
n = 36

Time Spent
Helping

0.88
(1.58)
n = 17

2.39
(2.00)
n = 36

2.94
(2.07)
n = 36

df

Mean
Difference

t

p-value

51

37%

2.663

0.005

51

1.51

2.723

0.004

df

Mean
Difference

t

p-value

70

8%

0.770

0.444

70

0.56

1.157

0.251

Panel B: Tests of Hypothesis (H3a)
VTO Present
versus
VTO Absent
Tendency to
Help
Time Spent
Helping

Panel C: Tests of Hypothesis (H3b)
VTO Present
versus
VTO +
Matching
Grant
Tendency to
Help
Time Spent
Helping

See Table 4.1 for variable definitions.
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FIGURE 4.1: Employee Volunteering Engagement
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FIGURE 4.2: Employee Work Productivity across Three Levels of
Volunteering Support
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FIGURE 4.3: Employee Altruistic Behavior across Three Levels of
Volunteering Support

46

Figure 4.4 Examples of Volunteering Output
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Offering support for employee volunteering is one of the fastest-growing areas of
employee benefits (Grant 2012; Rodell et al. 2016; Glassdoor 2017; Society for Human
Resource Management 2019; Knox 2020). Yet, little is understood about the potential
performance consequences of firm support for employee volunteering. In a setting where
employees receive salaried compensation, I examine how employees’ work productivity
and altruistic behavior inside the firm, as well as their volunteering engagement, are
influenced by the level of support (no support vs. VTO only vs. VTO + matching grant) a
firm provides for employee volunteering outside the firm. Drawing upon behavioral
theories, I predict and find that the level of firm support for employee volunteering not
only affects employees’ volunteering engagement outside the firm, but also affects
employees’ work productivity inside the firm. Moreover, I predict and find that although
the presence of firm support for employee volunteering spills over to positively influence
employee helping behavior inside the firm, the level of firm support is less consequential.
Specifically, my results show that first, providing a higher level of volunteering
support (VTO + matching grant) is effective in promoting employee volunteering
engagement. Second, VTO by itself does not impact employee work productivity,
compared to when VTO is absent. However, providing extra monetary support for
employee volunteering in the form of a matching grant significantly boosts their work
productivity inside the firm. Furthermore, my results show that although the presence of
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volunteering support spills over to positively influence employee altruistic behavior
inside the firm, the level of firm support does not make a significant difference.
Collectively, my results suggest that providing a matching grant in addition to VTO is
effective for promoting employee volunteering engagement and boosting their work
productivity, but not for the positive spillover of altruism inside the firm.
The results of my study offer important insights regarding implementing and
managing employee volunteering programs by showing that individual employee
volunteering programs can have multidimensional benefits that extend their value beyond
a CSR tool. My study also contributes to multiple streams of literature. First, it extends
the emerging accounting literature on charitable incentives that has primarily focused on
the performance effects of varying forms of monetary donations (Balakrishnan et al.
2011; Douthit et al. 2021; Johnson et al. 2021). My study introduces employee
volunteering programs as an alternative form of charitable incentive (i.e., time-based vs.
money-based donations) and provides initial evidence regarding the additive effects of
providing dual support of time and money. Second, by documenting the effects varying
levels of volunteering support have on individual employees, my study extends existing
volunteering research (Jones 2010; Rodell 2013; Newman et al. 2020; Cardinaels et al.
2020; Knox 2020) by providing clear causal evidence regarding the relation between
firm’s volunteering support for charitable causes outside the firm and employee work
behaviors inside the firm. My study advances our understanding of the potential
effectiveness of individual employee volunteering programs by showing that
volunteering support can serve as an effective management control to influence employee
behavior across three consequential outcomes: 1) employee volunteering engagement
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outside the firm; 2) employee work productivity; and 3) employee altruistic behavior
inside the firm. Lastly, by examining the spillover effects of employee volunteering
programs on employee behaviors internally, my study complements prior CSR literature
that has primarily focused on external benefits of corporate philanthropy (e.g., Elfenbein
et al. 2012; Lins et al. 2017; Hartzmark and Sussman 2019).
My study suggests several opportunities for future research. For instance, my
study focuses on the performance implications (namely volunteering engagement, work
productivity and employee altruistic behavior) of providing varying levels of support for
employee volunteering. Because there are other forms of volunteering support (e.g.,
training, volunteer recognition) and other meaningful performance outcomes (e.g.,
employee retention, whistleblowing, cooperation), future research could examine the
robustness of my results when other forms of volunteering support are provided and / or
the extent to which these forms of volunteering support affect other dimensions of
relevant performance outcomes. Additionally, since I am interested in a setting that
allows me to clearly test the behavioral effects of varying levels of volunteering support,
I use a fixed salary as the incentive contract in my experiment. Future research could
examine the effects of volunteering support in settings where incentive contracts are more
complex (e.g., individual performance-based, tournaments). Moreover, my study uses a
single-agent setting to examine the behavioral effects of individual employee
volunteering. Since some firms organize group volunteering activities (e.g., Corporate
Volunteer Day), future research could explore the extent to which my findings generalize
to multi-agent settings and settings where the volunteering activities are chosen by the
firm rather than by individual employees.
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